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War! What is it Good For? - Professional Reform
War birthed the United States and the nation has rarely stopped fighting
since its inception. During the long nineteenth century, the U.S. stumbled
through the War of 1812 against its former colonial ruler, increased its territorial
possessions via westward and foreign conquest, preserved national union
through Civil War, and tasted industrial slaughter during World War I. War’s
centrality to U.S. history has led to a growing body of scholarship examining the
nation’s preparation for mass violence. This literature often treats war colleges
and military academies as primary sites of historical inquiry into the institutional
indoctrination of specific professional values, training, and education. J.P. Clark
breaks from a normative measure of military professionalism. He instead charts
new conceptual ground to alter our understanding of the U.S. Army’s
professionalization.
Clark’s work is not about military professionalism, but rather military
professionalisms. He divides the Army men of the nineteenth century into four
successive generations (foundational, Civil War, composite, and progressive)
distinguished not by their age, but instead by military experience and societal
influence. His primary analytical focus is on moments of armed conflict and the
often-divergent lessons military thinkers drew from experiencing the same war.
Because Army officers drew differing conclusions from battle, efforts to better
prepare for the next war by reforming academy curricula, training practices, and
organizational structure regularly faced heated debate and resistance. One
generation’s pursuit of a new form of professionalism through military reform
presented a threat to another generation’s entrenched practices and career
trajectories. Clark suggests the intergenerational conflicts and differing
experiences of the nineteenth century’s Army parallels the service’s
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contemporary division between senior officers formed by the Cold War and
junior officers molded by the War on Terror.
Clark dubs the first of four generations of Army professionals the
“foundational” generation. Exemplified by Winfield Scott, the men in this
generation were veterans of the War of 1812 and subsequent West Point
graduates serving during the antebellum period. Scott repeatedly witnessed the
incompetence and cowardice of militia troops during the War of 1812. He aimed
to remedy the Army’s deficiencies with a tactical manual wedded to Napoleonic
line tactics that required discipline and coordination. Scott favored technical skill
fostering an elitist hierarchy within the foundational Army that elevated
engineering and ordinance officers above those in the infantry and cavalry. This
practice contrasted the relatively egalitarian spirit of the Jacksonian era.
Jacksonian politics, however, heavily impacted the Army’s officer corps as
politicians doled out commissions as forms of patronage. The
anti-intellectualism of the Jacksonian era also shined through the foundational
generation’s belief that “military genius” was an inherent trait of an individual,
rather than something learnable. This disposition to education, combined with
typical service conditions of small territorial detachment nearly devoid of
opportunities to rise in rank, contributed to a perception that “there was little
need for elaborate systems of professional training or education.”(5)
The Civil War’s massive mobilization of men, materiel demand, and cost in
lives created a sharp break from the foundational generation’s military
experience. Clark centers Emory Upton in his narration and analysis of the Civil
War’s ramifications upon a new generation of Army professionals. During the
Civil War, Upton regularly distinguished himself in combat and rapidly rose to
the rank of brigadier general at the young age of twenty-four. His success in
battle was in part due to his extensive operational planning and the continuous
training he imposed upon the volunteer soldiers under his command. Upton’s
most significant realization during the Civil War was that neither the generals in
command, nor their supporting staff, were qualified for their positions. Upton
railed against politicians or political appointees in command. Other incompetent
officers were simply products of an Army institution that had previously seen
little need for preparing them for large command, organization, or to teach
tactics to an untrained volunteer force. Upton’s post-war career shifted from the
battlefield to military education and writing. He served as the Commandant of
West Point then taught at other military schools while publishing on the need for
Army reform. Upton advocated merit-based promotion, a War College devoted
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to strategic theorizing not simply tactical proficiency, educational reform to
prepare officers for generalship, and the creation of a general staff system
mirroring Germany’s model of well-trained and rigorously selected
commanders.
Unfortunately for Upton, his reform measures faced opposition for decades.
Clark’s “composite” generation consists of Civil War regulars that stayed in
service and new enlistees through 1889. Clark characterizes this generation by its
variance in experience and thinking. Many officers that entered service after the
Civil War attended West Point while Upton was Commandant. This experience
led some to support his reform initiatives. However, the Army’s commanding
generals during the three decades following the Civil War—William T.
Sherman, Philip H. Sheridan, and John M. Schofield—were all among the top
commanders by the war’s conclusion and did not share Upton’s negative
perception of wartime leadership. Rather than recognizing institutional flaws
within the Army as Upton did, these members of the Civil War generation
considered their personal war-time performances more than proficient and
blamed others’ mistakes on individual incompetence. For these commanding
generals, the Civil War “served as an intellectual tether limiting how far the
profession could stray from past forms.” (129)
Clark insists none of the three commanding generals were unthinking
conservatives resisting change. Sherman commissioned Upton’s work and
agreed with some of his arguments. But with the Army’s size dramatically
reduced after the Civil War, and its primary function returned to its antebellum
role of territorial constabulary, few considered it necessary to adopt Upton’s
proposed reforms and prepare for a large war. Reforms were attempted, but not
seriously pursued. Examinations testing officers’ competence generally failed to
cull those who failed, as many still considered battlefield performance the only
true measure of a soldier. Schofield proved the most open-minded of the three
Civil War generals commanding the post-Civil War Army. He created the
officers lyceum tasking officers to draft research projects concerning
professional issues within the Army. However, Schofield failed to support this
experiment into intellectual work with additional instruction in producing
meaningful military scholarship. Michael F. Steele, a bookish officer and critic
of the lyceum, quipped most officers’ essays amounted to “a constipation of
ideas in a flux of words.” (136)
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Substantive reform in the Uptonian vein finally came during the
“Progressive” generation. During the Spanish American War, the U.S. Army
struggled to mobilize and equip troops, highlighting the lack of a general staff
devoted to pre-war planning. Elderly and physically unfit officers led their troops
to disaster on the battlefield. The Army’s ill-discipline horrifically and
controversially emerged in the Philippines through its use of the “water cure”
and indiscriminate violence to quell guerilla resistance. The prevalence of death
from disease further fueled public perceptions of Army incompetence. Clark
contrasts the Army’s poor performance with that of the U.S. Navy, which had
instituted extensive educational and professional reforms that proved effective
during the war.
The Spanish-American War’s numerous problems spurred public outcry and
official response. The negative findings of the Dodge commission’s
investigations led President McKinley to appoint Elihu Root, a corporate lawyer
devoid of military experience, as Secretary of War. The Root reforms reflected
the Republican Progressive’s commitment to the efficient power of proper
organization. After compelling political machinations detailed by Clark, Root’s
legislative efforts created a General Staff, reorganized the National Guard, and
followed Upton’s suggested modifications to the Army’s promotion and
education systems. Clark argues the progressive generation’s embrace of
organization, centralization, and specialization led to dramatically improved
military performance during the First World War. While Clark largely celebrates
the Army’s progress, he notes servicemen traded individualism for professional
indoctrination. Clark rightly notes that despite the immense destruction
demonstrated by industrial war, Army doctrine still improperly claimed the skill
of the infantryman could reign supreme over machine guns, tanks, and artillery.
Clark has done a wonderful job analyzing Army reformers’ efforts to revise
educational and organizational structures to better prepare for war. Yet his work
leaves notable gaps. Unlike Peter Karsten’s study of the Annapolis Naval
Academy in The Naval Aristocracy or Edward M. Coffman’s analysis of
transitionary twentieth century Army professionalism in The Regulars, Clark
does not substantively engage with race, class, or gender as analytical categories.
At some moments these analytics could improve his work and their absences are
problematic. For instance, he engages in detailed operational history during the
War of 1812, Civil War, and Spanish American War as supporting evidence for
the need to reform Army institutions. Yet the horrific details of Army action
motivated by racial hatred during wars against Native Americans receive scant
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attention. Clark could have treated Army racism as evidence of lacking
professionalism that exemplified ill-discipline, incited violent response, and
evoked negative public reaction.
Clark does attend to the Army’s engagement in indiscriminate warfare
through the targeting of Native American foodstuffs when enforcing Andrew
Jackson’s 1830 Indian Removal Act. He does so primarily to contrast Winfield
Scott, who found the act “professionally unappealing,” to other officers who
followed Jackson’s request to starve the natives. (44) What most shocked this
reviewer was Clark’s reference in this section to British officer C.E. Callwell’s
Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice as an “impressive and useful book”
that might have aided Army conquest if it existed decades prior to its 1896
publication. (43) It is difficult to stomach praise for Callwell’s Small Arms, a
work that drew from Britain’s numerous experiences in quelling rebellious
native societies to delineate the best tactics for imperial powers to follow, while
rationalizing acts then and now considered war crimes through an argument of
civilizational difference and racial savagery. Clark’s mention of Callwell’s work
when discussing events prior to its publication, then failure to analyze the source
in its more relevant context of U.S. anti-guerilla action in the Philippines, is
particularly confusing considering his recognition of other foreign influences on
Army policy and his close readings of other important works of military tactics
and policy.
Occasionally, Army officers derided their peers that showed a particular
interest in study and writing as a “book soldier” in contrast to a fighter. Clark
highlights this divide when discussing the confrontation over academy
curriculum and training between two members of his composite generation,
Eben Swift and Arthur L. Wagner. The latter wrote extensively in the Uptonian
vein advocating educational reform. The denigration of Wagner as an effete
soldier appears an ideal moment to consider how differing Army
professionalisms became wound up within conceptions of masculinity, but Clark
does not analyze the conflict in this manner. Wagner’s story becomes even more
interesting during the Spanish American War when he desperately attempted to
overcome his bookish reputation by serving in the field. This desire of the
dedicated professional student of war raises a broader question ignored by Clark,
but often discussed in the literature on military professionalism: Does military
professionalism and careerism foster a desire among soldiers to practice their
violent craft?
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Clark is an active duty Army officer who previously served as a Pentagon
strategist and history professor at West Point. Though there are gaps left in our
understanding of nineteenth- century Army professionalization, Clark has
produced a valuable work that will appeal to military historians, particularly
those interested in the Civil War’s legacy on Army education and organization.
Garrett McKinnon is a PhD student at Duke University studying United
States history. His research focuses on the rationales behind the U.S. military’s
adoption of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles during the twentieth century.
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